PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AS APPLIED IN LABOR CASE

Presumption of innocence is a doctrine normally used in criminal cases. However, the Supreme Court in this case applied the principle in resolving the labor case.

In gist, the SC held that the same way that the crime charged against an accused must first be proven before his or her right to liberty is taken away, or that a government employee’s infraction must first be proven before the accused is deprived of the right to continue to hold office, so too, must just cause against an employee be proven before he or she may be deprived of a means of livelihood. Otherwise, the employee’s right to substantive due process would be violated.

 Brown Madonna Press, Inc., Thaddeus Anthony A. Cabangon, et al. vs. Maria Rosario M. Casas
G.R. No. 200898, June 15, 2015

Facts:

Rosario M. Casas claims she was forced to leave her work, while the Brown Madonna Press, Inc. (BMPI) management asserts that she requested a graceful exit from the company to avoid an administrative investigation.

On January 5, 2007, Casas met with Cabangon, BMPI’s company president, and Victoria Nava (Nava), the Vice President for the Central Human Resource Department of the ALC Group of Companies. During the meeting, Casas was allegedly told not to report to work anymore starting January 8, 2007, upon the instructions of Cabangon-Chua, ALC’s Chairman Emeritus. Casas claims that the reason for her abrupt dismissal was not disclosed to her, but she was promised a separation pay. She thus packed her things and left.

BMPI, on the other hand, asserts that it was Casas who requested a graceful exit from the company during the meeting. The meeting was supposedly held to confront Casas about certain complaints against her, and about the growing rift between her and another company officer. BMPI asserts that Casas opted to leave the company to avoid an administrative investigation against her and to give her the chance to jumpstart her career outside the company. She succeeded in convincing Cabangon to grant her some form of financial assistance as they were friends.

Casas no longer reported for work on January 8, 2007, and BMPI, for its part, started the processing of her clearance. Subsequently, Casas sent Cabangon-Chua a letter asking for the reconsideration of his decision to terminate her employment. Cabangon-Chua did not act on this letter.

Thus, Casas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and for payment of separation pay, backwages, retirement benefits and attorney’s fees before the Regional Arbitration Branch.

LA Ruling:

The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Casas’ complaint for lack of merit, and ordered BMPI to reinstate her to her previous position without payment of backwages.

The LA found that Casas was not dismissed from work. The LA ruled that she instead abandoned her post. The LA held that no illegal dismissal takes place when the employee has not been notified of his dismissal. In the absence of any positive and overt act of dismissal, the claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained.

The LA noted that there was no written notice of Casas’ dismissal, and that it was contrary to sound business practice to verbally terminate an employee facing investigation for reported irregularities. BMPI had every reason to retain Casas’ services and to proceed with the investigation against her.

Thus, the LA agreed with BMPI’s contention that Casas left her work to pre-empt the investigation of complaints against her. Her act of packing her things on January 5, 2007, in fact, demonstrated that she no longer intended to return to work.

Casas appealed the LA’s ruling with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

NLRC Ruling:

The NLRC reversed the LA’s finding that Casas had not been illegally dismissed.

The NLRC found that Casas’ dismissal had been sufficiently established by evidence on record. It held that contrary to the BMPI et al.’s allegations, these records show that Casas’ services had been terminated by BMPI as she was issued a “Clearance and Quitclaim” document that clearly stated that she would “cease to be connected with the company at the close of office hours on January 16, 2007.” This, along with BMPI’s failure to respond to Casas’ May 17, 2007 letter asking for the reconsideration of her termination, constitute positive and overt acts of dismissal.

CA Ruling:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC’s ruling, and held that it did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that Casas had been illegally dismissed. The CA cited with approval the NLRC’s ruling that Casas’ dismissal was without cause and failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the law.

The CA explained that Casas is presumed innocent until proven guilty of the charges against her. Since her alleged infractions had not been investigated, it followed that Casas was dismissed without cause.

The CA also noted that BMPI failed to comply with the two written notices required prior to a lawful termination of an employee, and hence failed to comply with the procedural due process that the law requires.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the claim of graceful exit to defend against illegal dismissal complaint should be established by presenting proof of resignation

Whether or not the claim of resignation by employer should be supported by evidence

Whether or not there is abandonment despite the employee writing for reconsideration of “termination.”

Whether or not an act that would have constituted dismissal but not proven at the time of termination can establish valid dismissal.

SC Ruling:

The SC did not find merit in the petition.

Learn the rules on valid dismissal of employees. Get a copy of Guide to Valid Dismissal of Employees where doctrines and principles on valid dismissal are clearly discussed

The SC held that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the employee’s dismissal was legal. However, to discharge this burden, the employee must first prove, by substantial evidence, that he had been dismissed from employment.

The unsigned clearance and quitclaim document unilaterally prepared by BMPI, and the letter Casas sent to Cabangon-Chua, asking the latter to reconsider her termination sufficiently established Casas’ dismissal from the company. The Clearance and Quitclaim document discloses that Casas would “cease to be connected with the company at the close of office on January 16, 2007.”

Employers interposing their employee’s resignation as a defense from illegal dismissal cases have the burden of proving that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned. Resignation — the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of a position or office — is the voluntary act of an employee compelled by personal reason(s) to disassociate himself from employment. It is done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act manifesting this intent.

Cabangon failed to provide any documentary evidence supporting Casas’ voluntary resignation. BMPI failed to show any resignation letter from Casas.

An employee’s act not proven at the time he had been dismissed does not constitute just cause for his dismissal. In other words, for an act to justify an employee’s dismissal, it should have been proven, with substantial evidence, at the time he was dismissed. Otherwise, the dismissal would not be for just cause.

Cabangon’s claim that Casas asked for a graceful exit from the company is uncorroborated. What stands is Casas’ statement contradicting the claim that she had not been dismissed from her job.

The Clearance and Quitclaim document, which shows Casas’ severance from the company, does not contain her signature. Neither was Casas given any return to work order, notice of infraction, or notice of termination, all of which could have supported BMPI’s theory that Casas was never prevented from going back to work.

Unsubstantiated accusation will not ripen into a holding that there is just cause for dismissal. A mere accusation of wrongdoing is not sufficient cause for a valid dismissal of an employee. The facts for which a dismissal is based should be backed by substantial evidence at the time the employee is dismissed, and not at the time his dismissal is being questioned before the courts.

BMPI et al. allege that Casas had committed various infractions that would have warranted disciplinary action against her. At the time that Casas was dismissed, however, these alleged infractions were mere speculations.

Unsubstantiated accusation will not ripen into a holding that there is just cause for dismissal. A mere accusation of wrongdoing is not sufficient cause for a valid dismissal of an employee. The facts for which a dismissal is based should be backed by substantial evidence at the time the employee is dismissed, and not at the time his dismissal is being questioned before the courts.

Casas was, at the time of her dismissal, presumed innocent until proven guilty; thus, there existed no just cause to terminate her employment at the time she was summarily dismissed.

In these lights, the SC held that Casas’ summary dismissal had not been for just cause.