PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST EXECUTION OF NLRC DECISION IS PROPER WHEN THERE IS CHANGE IN THE SITUATION OF THE PARTIES

Preliminary injunction issued by the NLRC on account of the conflicting Court of Appeals decision was proper. Thus, the CA did not commit a reversible error in upholding the NLRC in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.

Frondozo, et al. vs. Manila Electric Company
G.R. No. 178379, August 22, 2017

Facts:

On May 16, 1991, a Notice of Strike (first strike) was filed by the MERALCO Employees and Workers Association (MEWA), composed of MERALCO’s rank-and-file employees, on the ground of Unfair Labor Practice (ULP).

Conciliation conferences conducted by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) failed to settle the dispute and resulted in a strike staged by MEWA on 6 June 1991. In an Order dated 6 June 1991, then Acting Secretary Nieves R. Confesor of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, ordered all the striking workers to return to work, and directed MERALCO to accept the striking workers back to work under the same terms and conditions existing prior to the work stoppage.

On 26 July 1991, MERALCO terminated the services of Crispin S. Frondozo (Frondozo ), Danilo M. Perez (Perez), Jose A. Zafra (Zafra), Arturo B. Vito (Vito ),7 Cesar S. Cruz (Cruz), Nazario C. dela Cruz (N. dela Cruz), Luisito R. Diloy (Diloy), and Danilo D. Dizon (Dizon) for having committed unlawful acts and violence during the strike.

On 25 July 1991, MEWA filed a second Notice of Strike (second strike) on the ground of discrimination and union busting that resulted to the dismissal from employment of 25 union officers and workers. Then DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued an Order dated 8 August 1991 that certified the issues raised in the second strike to the NLRC for consolidation with the first strike and strictly enjoined any strike or lockout pending resolution of the labor dispute. The Order also directed MERALCO to suspend the effects of termination of the employees and re-admit the employees under the same terms and conditions without loss of seniority rights.

The labor dispute resulted in the filing of two complaints for illegal dismissal:

1. NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-04146-92 filed by Dizon, Diloy, Patricio Maniacop, Wilfredo Lagason, Venancio Arguzon, Jr., Rogelio Antonio, Lauro Garcia, Alfredo Badilla, Jr., and Reynaldo Javier (Dizon, et al.); and
2. NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-06878-92 filed by MEWA, Reynaldo M. Caberte (Caberte), Alfredo dela Cruz (A. dela Cruz), Nataner F. Pingol (Pingol), Vincent G. Rallos, Enrique T. Barrientos (Barrientos), Melchor E. Banaga (Banaga), Zafra, Perez, Vito, N. dela Cruz, Cruz, and Frondozo.

The NLRC consolidated the two illegal dismissal cases with NLRC NCR CC No. 000021-91 (In the Matter of the Labor Dispute at the Manila Electric Company) and NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-03381-93 (MEWA v. MERALCO).

On 23 January 1998, the NLRC’s First Division rendered a Decision upholding Meralco’s dismissal of Jose A. Zafra, et al., in view of the illegal acts committed during the strike.

However, in a Decision promulgated on 14 December 2001, the NLRC First Division modified the 23 January 1998 Decision and declared the illegality of the strike of June 6-8, 1991, declared the officers and members who participated therein and who committed the illegal acts as having deemed to have lost their employment status, the dismissal of complainants Jose Zafra, et al. was declared unjustified, their participation in the commission of the prohibited and illegal acts not having been proved, and ordered Meralco to reinstate the twelve (12) complainants (Zafra, et al.), without payment of backwages.

In an Order dated 29 May 2002, the NLRC ruled on the motions for reconsideration filed by MERALCO, Dizon and Diloy, and the 12 respondents in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-06878-92 modifying the Decision appealed from and ordering the reinstatement of Dizon and Diloy.

From the 14 December 2001 Decision (illegality of strike, officers lost employment status, and reinstatement of Zafra, et al.) and 29 May 2002 Order of the NLRC (reinstatement of Dizon, et al.), two petitions for certiorari were filed before the Court of Appeals docketed as follows:

1. CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 filed by MERALCO; and
2. CA-G.R. SP No. 72509 filed by Frondozo, Barrientos, Pingol, Caberte, Zafra, Perez, Cruz, A. dela Cruz, and Banaga.

MERALCO moved for the consolidation of the two cases but the motion was denied. On 31 July 2002, the NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment stating that the 29 May 2002 NLRC Order became final and executory.

On 3 October 2002, Labor Arbiter Veneranda C. Guerrero (Labor Arbiter Guerrero) issued a Writ of Execution directing the reinstatement of the 14 respondents. In a Manifestation, MERALCO informed the NLRC of the payroll reinstatement of the 14 respondents.

On 30 May 2003, the Court of Appeals’ Special Second Division promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 (filed by Meralco) in favor of MERALCO. The Court of Appeals found that the strike of 6-8 June 1991 was illegal because it occurred despite an assumption order by the DOLE Secretary and because of the commission of illegal acts marred with violence and coercion. In view of said Decision dismissing the 14 respondents from the service, MERALCO stopped their payroll reinstatement.

On 11 June 2003, Labor Arbiter Guerrero approved the computation of backwages and ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution for the satisfaction of the judgment award. MERALCO filed a Manifestation calling the attention of Labor Arbiter Guerrero to the 30 May 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals’ Special Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480.

In an Order dated 7 October 2003, Labor Arbiter Guerrero ruled that the Court of Appeals’ 30 May 2003 Decision had not attained finality and as such, union members involved should be reinstated from the time they were removed from the payroll until their actual/payroll reinstatement based on their latest salary prior to their dismissal. An Alias Writ of Execution was issued for the satisfaction of the judgment award which resulted in the garnishment of MERALCO’s funds deposited with Equitable-PCI Bank.

Dizon, et al., filed their respective motions for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480, which the Court of Appeals denied.

On 27 January 2004, the Court of Appeals’ Fourteenth Division promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72509 (filed by Frondozo, et al.) modified in that respondent MERALCO is ordered to pay Frondozo, et al. full backwages computed from the time they were illegally dismissed, up to the date of their actual reinstatement in the service.

MERALCO filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Union members moved for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the satisfaction of their accrued wages arising from the recall of their payroll reinstatement. The Labor Arbiter Guerrero granted the motion. Thus, a Second Alias Writ of Execution was issued directing the Sheriff to cause the reinstatement of the respondents and to collect the amount representing backwages.

MERALCO filed a motion to quash the Second Alias Writ of Execution but it was denied. Hence, the Sheriff reported that the amount of P2,879,967.53 garnished funds had been delivered to and deposited with the NLRC Cashier for the satisfaction of the monetary award. However, the reinstatement portion of the judgment remained unimplemented due to the failure of MERALCO to reinstate the union members affected.

Dizon, et al., filed a petition before the Supreme Court assailing the 30 May 2003 Decision and 18 December 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals’ Special Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 (CA petition filed by Meralco). The case was docketed as G.R. No. 161159 (SC Petition by Dizon, et al.).

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On 12 February 2004, Frondozo, et al., filed a petition before the Supreme Court assailing the same 30 May 2003 Decision and 18 December 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals’ Special Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 (CA Petition filed by Meralco). The case was docketed as G.R. No. 161311 (SC Petition filed by Frondozo, et al.).

On 11 October 2004, Meralco filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning the 27 January 2004 and 17 August 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals’ Fourteenth Division promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 72509 (ordering payment of full backwages to Frondozo, et al.). The case was docketed as G.R. No. 164998 (SC Petition filed by Meralco).

In a Resolution dated 23 February 2004, the Supreme Court’s Third Division denied the petition in G.R. No. 161159 (SC petition filed by Dizon, et al.) on the ground that the petitioners failed to show that a reversible error had been committed by the Court of Appeals in rendering its Decision.

The SC’s Second Division referred G.R. No. 161311 (SC Petition filed by Frondozo, et al.) for consolidation with G.R. No. 161159 (SC Petition filed by Dizon, et al.).

In a Resolution dated 24 May 2004, the SC also denied with finality the motion for reconsideration of the 23 February 2004 Resolution denying the petition in G.R. No. 161159 (SC petition filed by Dizon, et al) on the ground that no substantial arguments were raised to warrant a reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution. In the same Resolution, the Court denied the petition in G.R. No. 161311 (SC Petition filed by Frondozo, et al.) for failure to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate court.

Frondozo, et al., (G.R. No. 161311) filed a motion for reconsideration of the 24 May 2004 Resolution denying their petition. In its 28 July 2004 Resolution, the the SC’s Third Division denied the motion with finality as no substantial arguments were raised to warrant a reconsideration of the Resolution.

The 23 February 2004 Resolution (SC petition filed by Dizon, et al.) became final and executory. The 24 May 2004 Resolution became final and executory.

In a Resolution dated 15 June 2005, the Supreme Court’s First Division denied the petition in G.R. No. 164998 (SC Petition filed by Meralco) for MERALCO’s failure to file a reply, amounting to failure to prosecute. MERALCO filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution of 22 August 2005. The 15 June 2005 Resolution became final and executory.

Meanwhile, MERALCO filed two motions before the NLRC:

• a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal filed on 5 July 2004 assailing the 10 June 2004 Order of Labor Arbiter Guerrero granting the issuance of the Second Alias Writ of Execution and directing the payment of backwages of P2,851,453 to respondents and ordering their reinstatement actually or in the payroll, which was accompanied by a bond equivalent to the amount of the accrued backwages; and
• An urgent motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction filed on 13 July 2004 directed against the Second Alias Writ of Execution pending the resolution of its first motion.

NLRC Ruling:

The NLRC granted the prayer for preliminary injunction of MERALCO. The NLRC considered the difficulty in proceeding with the execution given the conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals’ Special Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 (CA Petition filed by Meralco) and the Court of Appeals’ Fourteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72509 (ordering payment of full backwages to Frondozo, et al.) that were also passed upon by the Supreme Court, respectively, in G.R. Nos. 161159 (SC petition filed by Dizon, et al.) and 161311 (SC Petition filed by Frondozo, et al.) and in G.R. No. 164998 (SC Petition filed by Meralco).

The NLRC ruled that there is an insurmountable obstacle in the execution of the decision favoring complainants. If the NLRC would allow the execution proceed, it would disregard the Court of Appeals’ ruling in the MERALCO petition. On the other hand, the NLRC could not declare complainants to have been legally dismissed as this would contravene the Court of Appeals’ ruling in the Frondozo petition.

Confronted with this dilemma, and in deference to the exercise of the judicial power as the courts may find appropriate, the NLRC enjoined all proceedings until the parties would have exhausted all available judicial remedies toward the possible reconciliation of the contrasting decisions.

Two sets of motions for reconsideration were filed. In its Resolution promulgated on 26 May 2006, the NLRC denied the motions.

Frondozo, Perez, Zafra, Vito, Cruz, N. dela Cruz, and Diloy filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 28 February 2006 and 26 May 2006 Resolutions of the NLRC.

CA Ruling:

In its 6 March 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 28 February 2006 and 26 May 2006 Resolutions of the NLRC.

According to the Court of Appeals, MERALCO’s recourse was due to the two separate petitions before it (CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 and CA-G.R. SP No. 72509) that resulted in two contradictory rulings on the matter of petitioners’ dismissal.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the execution of a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party and is mandatory and ministerial on the part of the court or tribunal issuing the judgment. However, the Court of Appeals stated that a suspension or refusal of execution of judgment or order on equitable grounds can be justified when there are facts or events transpiring after the judgment or order had become final and executory, thus materially affecting the judgment obligation.

In the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ Decision, it denied due course on the petition filed and dismissed the same for lack of merit.

The petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 95747 filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 14 June 2007 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.

Hence, the petition for review filed before this Court by Frondozo, Perez, Zafra, Vito, Cruz, N. dela Cruz, and Diloy. Frondozo, et al. alleged that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the 28 February 2006 and 26 May 2006 Resolutions of the NLRC, in not passing upon the issues of reinstatement.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the issuance of preliminary injunction by the NLRC on account of two contradictory decisions of the CA, which suspended the execution of the Decision, was proper.

Whether or not the conflicting decision of the CA constitutes change in the situation of the parties that can justify issuance of preliminary injunction

Whether or not the finality of the CA Decision in CA G.R. No. 72480 on May 24, 2004, is a supervening event which transpired after the CA Decision in SP No. 72509 (which was in favor of petitioners) had become final and executory.”

SC Ruling:

The SC did not find merit in the petition.

There are instances when writs of execution may be assailed. They are:

• the writ of execution varies the judgment;
• there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;
• execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
• it appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court;
• the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or
• it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.

The situation in this case is analogous to a change in the situation of the parties making execution unjust or inequitable. MERALCO’s refusal to reinstate petitioners and to pay their backwages is justified by the 30 May 2003 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480.

On the other hand, Frondozo et al.’s insistence on the execution of judgment is anchored on the 27 January 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals’ Fourteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72509.

Given this situation, the SC did not see reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in holding that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings. Grave abuse of discretion implies that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

The SC held that the NLRC did not act in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner. It suspended the proceedings because it cannot revise or modify the conflicting Decisions of the Court of Appeals.

The SC held that the finality of CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 is not a supervening event. The Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 was promulgated on 30 May 2003. The Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72509 was promulgated on 27 January 2004.

Even when the cases were elevated to this Court, G.R. No. 161159 and G.R. No. 161311 were resolved first before G.R. No. 164998. The Court’s 23 February 2004 Resolution and the 24 May 2004 Resolution, both favoring MERALCO, became final and executory on 15 July 2004 and 2 September 2004, respectively, while the Resolution of 15 June 2005 which denied MERALCO’s petition for review became final and executory on 4 October 2005, over a year after the final resolutions in G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311.

Citing Agoy vs. Araneta Center, Inc., the SC held that when the Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA.

The decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct.” Hence, the Court’s Third Division adopted the findings and conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 which dismissed petitioners from the service.

The finality of the denial of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311 should be given greater weight than the denial of the petition in G.R. No. 164998 on technicality. It can also be interpreted that, in effect, the finality of the denial of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311 also removed the jurisdiction of the Court’s First Division and bound it to the final resolution in G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311.

The Court’s First Division denied MERALCO’s petition for failure to prosecute only on 15 June 2005, long after the denial of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311 became final and executory on 15 July 2004 and 2 September 2004, respectively.