DEATH OF SEAFARER THAT OCCURS AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF CONTRACT IS COMPENSABLE WHERE THERE IS CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE ILLNESS AND CAUSE OF DEATH

Death caused by illness which was either contracted in the course of seafarer’s employment or aggravated during the same period may be compensable where there is clear causal connection between such illness and the employee’s eventual death regardless of when such subsequent death occurred.

Thus, the SC held in the following case:

German Marine Agencies, Inc., et al. vs. Caro
G.R. No. 200774, February 13, 2019

Death compensation; Work-relatedness; Illness which caused the employee’s death contracted in the course of his employment or aggravated during the same period, where clear causal connection between such illness and the employee’s eventual death already legally exists, the death even after the end of contract becomes compensable; It is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death

Facts:

Petitioners German Marine Agencies, Inc., (German Marine) and/or Baltic Marine Mgt., Ltd. (Baltic Marine), or Carlos Anacta [collectively referred to as German Marine, et al.] were sued by respondent Teodolah R. Caro (Teodolah) for the death benefits and burial expenses in accordance with the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract6 (2000 POEA-SEC) for the death of her husband Eduardo V. Caro (Eduardo).

German Marine is a domestic corporation which recruited Eduardo for and in behalf of its foreign principal, Baltic Marine. Since May 1996, German Marine had continuously hired Eduardo until he signed his last employment contract with them as Second Officer for a period of nine months.

Prior to the signing of this contract, Eduardo underwent the Pre-Employment Medical Examination and was declared “fit to work.” Eduardo thereafter boarded the vessel “Pacific Senator”.

On January 3, 2006, Eduardo finished his contract of employment and was repatriated. On June 25, 2007, Eduardo died of “acute respiratory failure” while he was confined at the National Kidney and Transplant Institute.

Teodolah filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for death benefits, medical expenses, and attorney’s fees. Teodolah alleged that: (1) during Eduardo’s employment, he suffered dry cough and experienced difficulty in breathing and urinating; (2) Eduardo’s illness, which he tried to address by self-medication, is attributed to exposure to chemicals on board the vessel; (3) Eduardo felt very ill at the time of his repatriation but he merely endured it in the hopes of getting another contract; and (4) Eduardo consulted a physician at the Lung Center of the Philippines who diagnosed him to be suffering from bronchial asthma induced by chemicals.

LA Ruling:

The Labor Arbiter dismissed Teodolah’s complaint for lack of merit.

He ruled that Eduardo’s death is not compensable because it occurred after the expiration of his employment contract. The Labor Arbiter further reasoned that even assuming Eduardo died during the term of the contract, it was not clearly and sufficiently established that the cause of death was work-related or considered an occupational disease.

NLRC Ruling:

The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.

It held that Teodolah would be entitled to death benefits only if Eduardo died during the term of his employment contract. Since Eduardo died one (1) year, five (5) months, and twenty-three (23) days after the expiration of the contract, the employer-employee relationship already ceased to exist prior to his death; thus, Teodolah cannot be granted death benefits.

The NLRC likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Teodolah.

CA Ruling:

The CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC.

It held that a perusal of the record reveals that Teodolah was able to present substantial evidence to show her entitlement to death benefits. The CA found that Eduardo acquired bronchial asthma, an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, within the period of his service with Baltic Marine. For the CA, there was at least a reasonable connection between Eduardo’s job as a Second Officer and his bronchial asthma, which eventually developed into acute respiratory failure. It likewise held that it is of no moment that Eduardo died after the expiration of his last contract, because what is controlling is the fact that he acquired his lung disease while he was still rendering sea services.

Such disease was further aggravated by continued exposure to chemicals while on board. The CA held that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming the Labor Arbiter’s dismissal of the complaint considering that there was substantial evidence showing a causal connection between Eduardo’s lung illness and his work as a seaman. It thus ordered German Marine, et al. to pay Teodolah death benefits and burial expenses in accordance with the 2000 POEA-SEC.

The CA denied as well German Marine, et al.’s motion for reconsideration.

Read the Digest of Critical Decisions of the Supreme Court on Labor Cases for Years 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018

Issue/s:

Whether or not death of the seafarer that occurred after the end of contract is compensable where causal connection legally exists between the illness contracted during his employment and the cause of death

SC Ruling:

The SC found the petition unmeritorious.

When a party claims benefits for the death of a seafarer due to a work-related illness, one must be able to establish that: (1) the death occurred during the term of his employment; and (2) the illness is work-related.

Under the given definition of the 2000 POEA-SEC, a work-related illness is “any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.” The 2000 POEA-SEC creates a disputable presumption that illnesses not mentioned therein are work-related.

However, on the ground of due process, the claimant may still prove by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a person might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, that the seafarer’s work conditions caused or, at least, increased the risk of contracting the disease. This is because awards of compensation cannot rest entirely on bare assertions and presumptions; substantial evidence is required to prove the concurrence of the conditions that will merit compensability, consistent with the liberal interpretation accorded the provisions of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee in favor of the workers.

The SC held that Teodolah was able to prove through substantial evidence the causal connection between Eduardo’s work as a seafarer and his cause of death. Evidence substantiating the same included an enumeration of Eduardo’s exposure to chemicals, noise and whole-body vibrations, strong draft winds and stormy weather, cold stress and heat stress, excessive heat from burners and steam pipes, and ultraviolet radiation during welding operations while on board and in the exercise of his duties as a Second Officer for German Marine, et al.

Teodolah already established the causal link between the nature of Eduardo’s work and the cause of the deterioration of his health leading to his repatriation at the first instance in her complaint before the Labor Arbiter. There, she contended, among others, that after his repatriation, a physician at the Lung Center of the Philippines diagnosed him then to have been suffering from bronchial asthma, which was chemical-induced. These claims were not dispelled by the Labor Arbiter but were merely disregarded on the reasoning that Eduardo’s death was not compensable because it occurred after the expiration of his employment contract.

In the early case of lloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, it was held that the question of compensation coverage necessarily revolves around the core requirement of work-connection, and the corresponding evidence that establishes it. When it comes to evaluating work-relatedness with respect to its guiding provisions in labor laws and their implementing rules, the same must always be construed fairly, reasonably, or liberally in favor, or for the benefit, of employees and their dependents, with all doubts as to the right to compensation being resolved, and all presumptions indulged in their favor.

The application of the liberal construction in favor of labor in our jurisdiction and settled jurisprudence requires only that a reasonable connection between the nature of the occupation and the cause of death be established to entitle claimants to accountability, as aptly defined in the case of Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. vs. NLRC. In this case, it was held that it is enough that the employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death.

Veritably, if the illness which caused the employee’s death was either contracted in the course of his employment or aggravated during the same period, the clear causal connection between such illness and the employee’s eventual death already legally exists, making the death compensable regardless of when such subsequent death occurred.

It is not even required that the illness contracted during the course of employment be the exact same illness that caused the eventual death, for as long as it can be established that the work-related ailment he contracted during the course of his employment be that which triggered the deterioration of his body’s resistance against the said illness, any related condition, or any other affliction that he may have subsequently had.

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In the present case, Eduardo’s causes of death included acute respiratory failure which was diagnosed as secondary to pulmonary thromboembolism. It does not demand a stretch of the imagination to reasonably presume that the conditions to which Eduardo was exposed to during the fulfillment of his duties as Second Officer aboard German Marine, et al.’s vessel at the very least contributed to either the contracting of said respiratory illness or the aggravation thereof.